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I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet has given people the power to transmit and reproduce vast
amounts of information, including copyrighted works, such as books,
* Heidi Pearlman Salow is an attorney at Cole, Raywid & Braverman, L.L.P., in
Washington, D.C., specializing in telecommunications, intellectual property and Internet law. She
expects to receive an LL.M. degree in Intellectual Property from George Washington University
in Spring 2002. She wishes to thank Rachael Galoob and David Silverman, who read an earlier
version and provided helpful comments; and Dan Stohr, who assisted with research and cite
checking.
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articles, music, graphics, and even streaming digital video. The automatic
reproduction processes of networked computers, along with the fact that
any computer in the world can easily and inexpensively access such works
through the Internet, has led to copyright infringement on a more
widespread scale than anyone could have anticipated even five years ago.
Internet Service Providers' (ISPs) often give their subscribers the means
to make documents available to the public. For example, an ISP may give
its subscribers the right to upload web pages to the ISPs publicly
accessible servers, in addition to providing email accounts and Internet
access. These web pages may then be accessed and automatically copied
by computers belonging to any other individual with access to the Internet.
Problems arise when subscribers abuse this privilege and post material that
violates copyright law.
ISPs themselves arguably infringe copyright owners' exclusive rights
of reproduction and distribution every time one of their subscribers
uploads or downloads a copyrighted work without permission.
Transmitting information over the Internet requires the passive
reproduction and distribution of material over computers. For example,
when an ISPs subscriber uploads material to web pages, the ISPs computer
makes and stores a copy of the uploaded material. After that, each time
anyone accesses the subscriber's web page, the ISPs server makes a copy
and sends the copy to the person viewing the web page. Similarly, if a
subscriber downloads information from the Internet, the ISP has made a
copy of the material in sending it to the subscriber.
If the ISP were liable for copyright infringement in connection with
these passive activities, copyright holders would likely be more inclined
to sue the ISP than the person directly responsible for the infringement.
There are a few reasons for this. First, it is much easier to locate an ISP for
service of process. Many ISPs are corporate entities with easily
identifiable places of business, whereas copyright infringers may be
individuals who are difficult to find. Second, infringers are likely to lack
the financial resources to pay a substantial liability judgment, whereas
ISPs have deeper pockets.
In an effort to limit the potential liability for ISPs while avoiding a
deterioration in online copyright protection, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.2 This article focuses on Title
II of the DMCA, the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation

1. The term "Internet Service Provider" or ISP traditionally refers to a company that
provides only access to the Internet. This article will use this term to refer to companies, such as
AOL, that not only provide access, but also provide some content. These latter companies are
sometimes referred to as "online service providers" or OSPs.
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DCMA), Pub.L.No. 105 - 304, 112 State
28,60 (1998).
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Act." Before Title I was enacted, an ISP might have been required to
aggressively monitor its servers for copyright infringements to avoid the
threat of copyright liability. This type of monitoring would have had
severe drawbacks. Systematic policing of content threatened subscriber
privacy and freedom from online censorship. Additionally, an ISP often
stores so much information on its servers that reviewing this information
regularly would be problematic and costly. Even if the ISP were able to
review the data regularly, it would often be difficult, if not impossible, to
identify infringing material. As a result, the ISP may have either failed to
remove infringing material or removed material that appeared to be
infringing but was not.
The DMCA establishes "safe harbors" from liability for those ISPs that
comply with elaborate procedures, but does not otherwise change ISP
liability under common law. As discussed in greater detail in Section
IV.C., these procedures vary according to the type of service offered by
the ISP. For example, if an ISP is simply acting as a "passive conduit,"
protection from liability is almost automatic. On the other hand, if an ISP
provides some type of storage, such as web hosting, hyperlinking or
caching, the ISP must comply with a "notice and take-down" procedure.
This article will explain the confusing legal environment before the
DMCA was enacted and Congress' reasons for passing the legislation. It
will then discuss the DMCA's tumultuous legislative history and
Congress' attempt to balance the interests of copyright owners and ISPs.
It will conclude with a discussion about whether this legislation was
necessary and the cases which have thus far interpreted Title 11.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY APPLICABLE TO

ISPs UNDER

PRE-DMCA CASE LAW
Before the DMCA was enacted, relatively few cases addressed the
issue of ISP copyright infringement liability. There are three theories
under which ISPs are potentially liable for their subscribers' copyright
infringement: direct, vicarious or contributory infringement. Pre-DMCA
cases addressing each type of liability are discussed below.
A. Pre-DMCA Cases ConsideringDirect Copyright
Infringement by ISPs
A finding of direct copyright infringement is based on two factors: 1)
the plaintiffs ownership of a valid copyright and 2) a defendant's
violation of one of the plaintiff's exclusive rights. The 1976 Copyright Act
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imposes strict liability for direct copyright infringement, but knowledge
is relevant to an award of statutory damages.3
In 1993, a Florida court issued the first reported decision addressing
copyright infringement online. ' Playboy Enterprisesv. Frenainvolved a
service, called a Bulletin Board System (BBS),5 which was very popular
before the creation of the World Wide Web. Fee-paying subscribers could
upload and download photographs on the BBS. Playboy owned exclusive
copyrights for many of these photographs, and Playboy sued the BBS
operator for direct copyright infringement. The court found the BBS
operator liable for direct copyright infringement because "[it] supplied a
product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work. It does not6
matter that [defendant] claims it did not make the infringing copies itself.",
The court, citing the Copyright Act's strict liability standard, rejected the
BBS operator's argument that it was unaware of the infringement. 7 "
A couple of years later, a California federal court reached a different
conclusion in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communications Services, Inc.8 The plaintiffs owned copyrights in the
writings of the founder of the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard. A
former member of the Church, Erlich, posted messages to a BBS that
contained excerpts of the copyrighted works. Erlich had contracted with
the BBS operator for the right to post messages on the BBS. The BBS
operator in turn had obtained Internet access from an ISP, Netcom. Thus,
Netcom had an attenuated connection to Erlich, the actual infringer.
When Erlich transmitted a message to the BBS operator, the operator's
computer temporarily stored the message. In addition, through Netcom's
software, Erlich's message was automatically copied onto Netcom's
computer. His message was then stored for three days on the BBS
operator's computer and for eleven days on Netcom's computer so that
others could access it.9

3. 17 U.S.C.A. §504(c)(2) (West 1996).
4. Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("Playboy").
5. An electronic bulletin board ("BBS") consists of electronic storage media, such as
computer memories or hard disks, which are connected to telephone lines by modem devices, and
are controlled by a computer. Users of BBSs can transfer information from their own computers
to the storage media on the BBS by uploading the information, or they can download information
from the BBS onto their computers. Sega Enterprises,Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927
(N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Sega I").
6. Playboy, supra note 4, at 1556.
7. Id. at 1559.
8. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line CommunicationsServices, Inc. 907 F.

Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Netcom").
9. Id. at 1367.

20011
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Plaintiffs sued the operator of the BBS and Netcom on grounds of
direct liability.'t The court rejected the notion that either the BBS operator
or Netcom was directly liable for Erlich's infringement." The court
reasoned that holding as such would result in many separate acts of
infringement by others: "It does not make sense to adopt a rule that could
easily lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the
infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that
is necessary for the functioning of the Intemet."' 2 Despite the strict
liability standard in the Copyright Act, the court read into it an exception
for purely passive acts by third parties and
3 noted that some element of
required.'
be
should
causation
volition or
The following year, that same court, relying on its earlier decision in
Netcom, again refused to find a BBS operator liable for direct
infringement. 14 In Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. MAPHIA ("Sega H"), the court
stressed that the BBS operator did not upload or download the infringing
files himself and thus did not directly cause the copying.' 5 Interestingly,
at an earlier stage of the same proceeding, the court had determined that
Sega, an owner of copyrighted video game programs, had established a
prima facie case of direct infringement.' 6 After Netcom was decided,
however, the court clarified its earlier holding: "[w]hether [the BBS
operator] knew his BBS users were infringing on Sega's copyright, or
encouraged them to do so, has no bearing on whether [the BBS operator]
directly caused the copying to occur.' 7 Since Sega had not shown that the
copying, the BBS operator was held not
BBS operator directly caused the
8
liable for direct infringement.'
B. Pre-DMCA Cases Considering VicariousInfringement by ISPs
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly recognize vicarious
liability, courts have imposed it when the plaintiff has proven that a third

10. Plaintiffs also sued on vicarious and contributory liability theories, discussed in Sections
11. B. and II.C., respectively. id. at 1372.
11. Id. at 1372.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 1369-70.
14. Sega II, supra note 5.
15. idt at 932.
16. Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Sega I"). In
issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, in Sega I the court found that each of the
four fair use factors weighed against a finding of fair use. The court was particularly concerned that
if the unauthorized copying of plaintiff's video games became widespread, there would be a
"substantial and immeasurable adverse effect on the market" for the video game programs. Id at
688.
17. Sega I, 948 F. Supp. at 932.
18. Id.
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party defendant: 1) had the right and ability to control the direct infringer
and 2) received a direct or indirect financial benefit from the infringement
of the copyrighted work.' 9 Of course, a court must first determine that
direct infringement has occurred.
The Netcom court considered the issue of whether the ISP, Netcom,
and the BBS operator were vicariously liable for Erlich's direct
infringement.20 As to Netcom, the plaintiffs argued that it had the ability
to supervise Erlich and had a direct financial interest in the infringement. 2 '
Netcom's subscriber agreement specifically prohibited copyright
infringement, gave Netcom the right to suspend subscribers who engaged
in commercial advertising, posted obscenity or "off-topic" material, and
required subscribers to indemnify Netcom for third party damages.22 The
court found that Netcom may have had the ability to supervise, but it did
not have the requisite direct financial interest. 3 Thus, Netcom was not
held vicariously liable. 24 The court did not impose vicarious liability on
the BBS operator either, because there were insufficient factual allegations
to support such liability.25 Specifically, plaintiffs failed to show that the
BBS operator had the right and ability to control Erlich's
activities and had
26
a direct financial interest in Erlich's infringement.
Before the DMCA was enacted, only one other court had considered
the issue of vicarious liability for ISPs. In Marobie-FL,Inc. v. National
Association of Fire Equipment Distributors(NAFED), 27 a fire equipment
association had a web page hosted by its ISP, Northwest Nexus. NAFED
copied plaintiffs copyrighted clip art onto its web page. Those who
accessed NAFED's web page could view or download the clip art. The
plaintiff, Marobie, sued NAFED for direct infringement and Northwest
Nexus for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.

19. See S. REP. No. 94-473, at 57 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (legislative
history of Copyright Act).
20. Netcom, supranote 8, at 1375-78.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1375-76. Both Netcom and the BBS operator charged a fixed fee. Thus, there was
no connection between infringements and payments to Netcom or the BBS operator.
23. Id. at 1375-77.
24. Id. at 1377.
25. Id. at 1382.
26. The BBS operator indicated that he would comply with plaintiffs' request to take action
by deleting the infringing postings from his BBS if plaintiffs mailed him the original copyrighted
work and he found that they matched the allegedly infringing posting. The court found that the
letter raised a question as to whether plaintiffs could show that he could control Erlich's activities.
However, plaintiffs' failure to establish a connection between a financial benefit and the infringing
postings was fatal to their claim for vicarious liability. Id. at 1383.
27. Marobie-FL Inc. v. NationalAssociation of FireEquipment Distributors,983 F. Supp.
1167 (N.D. I11.1997).
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Unlike Netcom, Northwest Nexus had a contractual relationship with
the infringer.2 Nevertheless, the court denied Marobie's motion for
summary judgment on the vicariously liability issue, finding that the flat
fee paid by NAFED to Northwest Nexus made a finding of direct financial
interest impossible, notwithstanding the possible right and ability to
supervise NAFED.29
In the aftermath of the Netcom and Marobie decisions, courts were not
likely to impose vicarious liability on ISPs that received only a flat fee for
Internet access and had no control over subscriber uploads and
downloads. 3°
C. Pre-DMCA Cases Considering ContributoryInfringement by ISPs
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners not only the right to
exercise exclusive rights, but also the right to "authorize" the exercise of
those rights. 3' The authorization right was "intended to avoid any question
as to the liability of contributory infringers"- those who do not exercise the
copyright owner's rights themselves, but authorize others to do so. 3 2 Other
than the reference to the "authorization" right, the Copyright Act does not
mention or define "contributory infringement. 33 Nevertheless, courts
have considered whether an ISP can be liable as a contributory infringer
based on its provision of the services or equipment related to the direct
infringement. As discussed below, for a court to hold an ISP contributorily
liable, it first must find that that
the ISP knew of the infringement and
34
it.
in
participated
substantially
Only a few pre-DMCA cases considered the possibility that an ISP
could be liable for contributory infringement. Thus, before the DMCA was
enacted, the law was far from settled on this issue. In Netcom, the court
considered and rejected Netcom's motion for summary judgment on a

28. Recall that Netcom had a contractual relationship with a BBS operator, who in turn had
a contractual relationship with the infringer. The Netcom court did not consider this lack of privity
to be relevant to the issue of whether Netcom was liable. Netcom, supra note 8, n.22.
29. Id at 1179.
30. Cf.Alfred C. Yen. Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement,EnterpriseLiabilityand the FirstAmendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1848-1865 (2000)
(discussing various theories under which courts could find ISPs vicariously liable for subscriber
infringements).
31. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
32. BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INTEUECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRCuTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995), at 109 (hereinafter "WHrrE PAPER") (citing H.R. REP. No.94-1476, at
61 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5674).

33. Id.
34. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. ColumbiaArtists Management,Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

(Vol. 6

contributory infringement claim. 35 The court ruled that Netcom could be
liable for contributory infringement if plaintiffs could prove that Netcom
knew the infringing material resided on its system and substantially
participated in contributing to the infringing conduct of the primary
infringer. There were questions of fact on these issues since Erlich
continued to post infringing material even after Netcom was notified of the
infringement claim. In addition, the court considered whether Netcom, by
offering a service which allows for automatic distribution of all postings,
infringing or noninfringing, substantially assisted Erlich's desire to
publicly distribute the infringing postings by not taking action to remove
them. 36 These issues were never resolved since the case subsequently
settled.37
In Sega II, the court found the BBS operator liable for contributory
infringement because 1) he knew that BBS subscribers were copying
Sega's video games3' and 2) his operation of the BBS constituted
"substantial participation" in the direct infringements.39 In addition to
providing, monitoring, and operating the BBS software, hardware, and
phone lines necessary for the users to upload and download games, the
BBS operator actively solicited users to upload unauthorized games. He
also sold video game copiers, referred to as "Super Magic Drives," to
facilitate playing the downloaded games. 40
Another pre-DMCA case, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,41
expanded the scope of third party contributory infringement, albeit in a
non-Internet context.4 2 Plaintiff Fonovisa owned copyrights in music
recordings. Defendant operated a swap meet and rented space to vendors
selling various products. Some of these vendors sold recordings that
infringed Fonovisa's copyrights. A sheriff notified defendant of this
infringement, thereby satisfying the "knowledge" prong of the

35. Netcom, supra note 8.

36. 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
37. See Tom Klemesrud, Klemesrud Press Release (Aug. 22, 1996), at
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Scientology-cases/960822_Jkemesrudsettl.announce> (last
visited March 31, 2001).
38. The BBS operator admitted that users were allowed to upload and download Sega games

from his MAPHIA BBS. Moreover, evidence indicated that he tracked, or at least had the ability
to track, user uploads and downloads. Sega II, supra note 5, at 928.
39. See id
40. Id. at 929.
41. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
42. The court also found defendant vicariously liable on two grounds. First, defendant had
the right and ability to force vendors to leave the meet at any time. Second, the defendant received
financial benefit by collecting fixed rental fees on a daily basis from infringing vendors as well as
collecting admission, parking fees, and snack bar proceeds from customers. These latter fees were
viewed as proportionate to the number of customers entering the swap meet to purchase infringing
copies. Id. at 262-63.
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contributory infringement test. As to the 'substantial participation' prong
of the contributory infringement test, the court found that the defendants'
provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, and customers to any and
all vendors materially contributed to the direct infringement of the
individual vendors. The court reasoned that "providing the site and
facilities for known4 3infringing activity is sufficient to establish
contributory liability.

II. THE WHITE HOUSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE REPORT ("WHrrE PAPER")

Against this backdrop of developing case law, copyright owners started
focusing attention on ISPs. As Internet use began to flourish in the mid90s, copyright owners argued that ISPs helped to provide the facilities
(network and access) and audience (users) for direct infringers and
financially benefited from the traffic and fees generated by infringing
bulletin boards, newsgroups and web sites." From the copyright owners'
perspective, ISPs had the ability to determine whether infringing material
was being transmitted over their networks and stored on their servers.4
The ISPs, on the other hand, argued that the volume of material
transmitted over their systems was too large to monitor; that even if an ISP
were willing and able to monitor material on its own system, it could not
necessarily identify infringing material;4 and that failure to protect ISPs
from liability would slow down networks and impair communications,
ultimately driving ISPs out of business.
In 1995, in response to widespread complaints from the entertainment
and computer software industry, the Clinton administration (through a
working group chaired by Bruce Lehman, the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, and Ronald Brown, the former Secretary of Commerce)
proposed legislation in a report called Intellectual Property and the
NationalInformationInfrastructure(White Paper).48 The Working Group
considered the arguments from both sides, and concluded that it was

43. Id. at 264.
44. See TIMOTHY D. CASEY, ISP LIABUITY SURVIVAL GUIDE 99 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

2000).
45. Id. at 100.
46. As pointed out by Tim Casey, one of the people involved in negotiating the DMCA, an
ISP has no way of knowing what is inside "every one of the billions of data packets transmitted
over its network every day." Further, even if the ISP could somehow put enough packets together
to figure out the content of an email message or posting, the ISP still would not know whether the
content was protected by copyright and if so, would not know if the person who posted or sent the
message had the copyright owner's permission. See id. at 101.
47. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 32. at 115-116.
48. Id.
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premature to enact legislation that would reduce the liability of ISPs. 9
The Working Group recognized that "trillions of bits representing
millions of messages and files travel through networks each day" and it is
"virtually impossible for operators of large systems to contemporaneously
review every message transmitted or file uploaded. "5 Nevertheless, the
Working Group analogized ISPs to photo finishers, book and record stores,
newsstands and computer software retailers, all of whom are subject to
strict liability as distributors if they sell infringing copies.5 Further, the
Working Group reasoned, online service providers can investigate and take
appropriate action when notified that infringing material resides on their
networks, thereby reducing liability for damages.52 In sum, according to
the White Paper,the risk of infringement liability
is a legitimate cost of
53
doing business for online service providers.
If implemented, the legislation proposed in the White Paper would
have made ISPs strictly liable for any copyright infringement by any
subscriber.- To succeed in court, a copyright holder would have simply
had to show that an infringing work was transmitted across the ISPs
network. 55 The White Paperrelied heavily upon the Sega I and Playboy
decisions in reaching its conclusions.56
IV. THE ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY LIMITATION

Ac-WHAT DID CONGRESS INTEND TO ACcoMPLIsH?

A. The Debate over ISP Liability
Fearing that courts would use Playboy, Fonovisa and Sega I as
precedent to impose liability, ISPs began to lobby legislators during the
104th Congress (1995-96) for legislation to clarify that certain judicially
created doctrines discussed above should not apply in the digital
environment.57 ISPs argued that the enormous amount of traffic on the
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id. at 116.
51. Id.
52. Under the Copyright Act, in cases of "innocent infringement," the court may in its
discretion reduce an award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. 17 U.S.C.A.

§504(c)(2).
53. WHrTE PAPER, supra note 32, at 116-118. The Working Group was swayed by the
tremendous growth in the on-line service industry and concluded that the risk of liability was
outweighed by the benefits to the "more than 60,000 bulletin board operators currently in business."
Id. at 118.
54. The White Paper endorsed the holding in Playboy, supra note 4, that a service provider
can be directly liable even without knowledge that infringement has occurred. Id. at 120-121.

55.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 117-118, 122-124.
56. Id. at 120-122.
57. Michele A. Ravn, Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the DigitalMillennium Copyright
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Internet made it impractical to monitor the activities of their subscribers.5"
In addition, they argued that if online service providers were faced with
strict liability for the infringements of their subscribers, they would pass
the cost of this liability onto the subscribers in the form of higher access
fees. 59
At the same time, Congress faced an equally strong lobby, supported
by the White Paper,against creating a statutory exemption for ISPs. The
motion picture and recording industries argued that shielding ISPs from
liability would remove any incentive for them to prevent infringing content
from being transmitted over the Internet. In addition, these industries
proposed that ISPs providing web hosting and search engines should
require that subscribers providing web pages guarantee that these pages are
free from infringing content. These industries also contended that
judicially created doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability fairly
and reasonably determined when ISPs can be held responsible for
copyright infringements directly committed by their subscribers.
The testimony of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America, is illustrative:
Of those few cases that have gone to court, none has resulted
in the imposition of debilitating damage awards on an
"innocent" OSP or ISP that had no involvement, other than
providing network services, in infringing activity. Where
providers have been held liable, it's [sic] quite clear...that
they were well aware of, or were even active participants in,
the violations enabled by their services. As for the assertion
that the threat of infringement liability is a dagger pressed
against the jugular of the Internet, well, the best that can be
said is that it simply is not so. The growth rates of the
business of providing access to the Internet are
astronomical .... Before jumping straight to legislative "fixes"
of the online liability "problem," Congress must specifically
identify what -- if anything -- is broken in the current law....

If it does so, I believe it will conclude that any change in the
statute on this issue is, at best, premature. 60

Act Was Needed to Chart the Course of Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright
Infringement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 755, 778 (1999).
58. Id See also On-Line CopyrightLiability Limitation Act and WIPO Copyright Treaties
Implementation Act: Hearingon H.R. 2280 andH.R. 2281 Before the HouseJudiciaryCommittee,

Courts andIntellectual PropertySubcommittee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Edward Black,
President, Computer and Communications Industry Association) ("[s]ervice providers do not know,
nor would we be capable of knowing, the billions of bits of information that we are transmitting
over tens of thousands of lines").
59. Statement of Edward Black, supra note 58.
60. On-Line CopyrightLiabilityLimitationAct and WIPOCopyright TreatiesImplementation
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Representative Bob Goodlatte spent months leading negotiation
sessions between copyright owners and ISPs, telephone companies,
libraries, and universities. 1 Eventually, after several bills were introduced
and amended in both Houses, a legislative compromise was reached. 62 The
compromise became Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act.63 Title I codified a liability system
based on the existing core of case law regarding ISP copyright liability,
while narrowing and clarifying' the law in other respects.65
B. The DMCA's Origins:House Bill 2281 and Its Predecessors
In July 1997 Representative Howard Coble,66 along with
Representatives Henry Hyde, John Conyers and Barney Frank, introduced
H.R. 2281, the bill which eventually became the DMCA. This bill, called
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
Performances and Phonograms Treaty Implementation Act, proposed to
add a new Section 1201 to the Copyright Act prohibiting the manufacture
or import of products that circumvent technologies that restrict access to
unauthorized works.67 The same month, Representative Coble introduced
House Bill 2180 which proposed to exempt ISPs that are merely passive
conduits to the Internet from direct or vicarious liability, subject to certain
conditions. 68 Representative Coble remarked that the bill was meant to be
a "new starting point for discussion among the groups affected by its

Act: Hearing on H.R. 2280 and H.R. 2281 Before the House JudiciaryCommittee, Courts and
Intellectual Property Subcommittee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Industry Association of America).
61. S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998).
62. Id.
63. The original version of the House Bill which eventually became Title II was called
"Internet Copyright Infringement Liability Clarification Act of 1998." H.R. REP. NO. 105-551,PART
11,at 12 (1998).
64. See 143 Cong. Rec. E1452-E1454 (daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Representative

Coble).
65. See MELVu.EB. NIMMERANDDAVIDN[MMER, Section-by-SectionAnalysis ofH.R. 2281
as passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on Aug. 4, 1998, reprinted in NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, CRI:7 (2000).
66. Representative Coble was Chair of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property,
a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.
67. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997).
68. To qualify for H.R. 2180's "passive conduit" exemption, the ISP would have had to: 1)
not place the infringing material online; 2) not generate, select or alter the content of the material;
3) not select the recipients of the material; 4) not receive any direct financial benefit from the
infringement; 5) not sponsor, endorse or advertise the infringing material; and 6) not know or have
received notice that the material is infringing. H.R. 2180, 105th Cong.
§ 512(a)(I)(A)-(F)(1997).
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provisions." 69 As a result of Representative Goodlatte's negotiations with

copyright holders and ISPs, H.R. 2180 was eventually substituted with
H.R. 3209. 70 The latter bill was eventually incorporated into H.R. 2281.71
After several amendments, H.R. 2281 passed the House on August 4,
1998.72 The Senate then received H.R. 2281 and struck all language after
the Enacting Clause, substituting the language of its own bill, S. 2037.
During the fall of that year, H.R. 228 1, as amended, went to conference.73
As a result of the conference, the Senate essentially receded to the House
bill, which contains the current language of Title 11.7'
C. Title I: The Online CopyrightInfringement Liability LimitationAct

Title II limits liability for four general categories of ISP activity: 1)
transitory digital network communications,75 2) system caching, 6 3)
information residing on systems or networks at direction of users77 and 4)
information location tools.78 In order to qualify for any of these liability
limitations, or safe harbors, an ISP must meet the following eligibility
requirements. 79 First, it must adopt, reasonably implement and inform
subscribers of a policy for terminating repeat copyright infringers.80
Second, it must accommodate, and not interfere with, standard technical

measures. 8' A standard technical measure is a technology, subject to
certain conditions, used by copyright owners to identify or protect
69. Statement of RepresentativeCoble, supranote 64.
70. See Ravn, supra note 47, at 780-81. During the same Congress, Senator John Ashcroft
introduced the "Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997." This bill,
which never made it out of committee, contained a "notice and take down" provision which
exempted ISPs from liability if they take down infringing material expeditiously once notified by
the copyright owner. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997).
71. Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers:
Problem Solved.. .ForNow, 51 IED. COMM. L. 823, 840 (1999).
72. The Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property held two days of hearings in
September 1997 and subsequently marked up the bill. After being reported to the full House, the
bill was referred jointly to the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Ways and Means
for consideration of those provisions under the jurisdiction of those Committees. The Committee
on Commerce marked up the bill and reported the revised version in House Report 105-551. The
Committee on Ways and Means did not mark up the bill but insisted that certain language be
excluded from the bill. See NIMMER, supra note 65 at CR1:7-5.
73. H.R. CON. REP. No. 105-796 (1998).
74. Id. at 73.
75. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a).
76. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(b).
77. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
78. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d).
79. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i).
80.
17 U.S.C.A. §512(i)(1)(A).
81. 17 U.S.C.A. §512(i)(1)(B).
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copyrighted works.8 2 In addition to these basic eligibility requirements,
ISPs must meet the specific criteria listed below for each of the four safe
harbors.
The first type of safe harbor, transitory digital network
communications, can be characterized as "passive conduit" activity. For
purposes of this safe harbor, a service provider is defined as "an entity
offering the transmission, routing or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the
material as sent or received." 83 The types of ISPs that would normally fall
under this definition are those that run a backbone network, provide an
email server, or provide Internet access. If the conditions listed below are
satisfied, these ISPs would qualify for the "passive conduit" safe harbor
even if the form of material is modified by their systems during
transmission, as long as the content is not modified.84 For example, a mere
change in form might result in an email transmission appearing to the
recipient without bolding or italics.
The following conditions apply to the "passive conduit" safe harbor.
The ISP must not have selected the recipients of the infringing content. 85
In addition, the content must have been transmitted through an automatic
technical process86 and the ISP must not retain intermediate copies of the
content for longer than necessary to transmit the information.87 If the ISP
satisfies these conditions, it receives immunity from monetary damages. 8
The second type of safe harbor, system caching, refers to a process
whereby the ISP retains a temporary copy of frequently accessed Internet
material so that subsequent requests for the material can be retrieved from
that retained copy instead of having to be retrieved from the original
source. 89 To qualify for the "system caching" safe harbor, the material

82. The technical measure must have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary multi-industry standards process,
must be available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, and must not impose
substantial cost on service providers or their systems and networks. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2).
83. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A). Forpurposes of the other three safe harbors, service provider
is defined as a "provider of online service or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor."
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(B). In essence, the distinction is meant to clarify that certain service
providers (e.g., those that host content on their servers) do not qualify for the broader liability
limitation in subsection (k)(1)(A).
84. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)(5).
85. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)(3).
86. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)(2).
87. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)(4). This section refers to copies made while material is en route to
its destination, such as copies made on a router or mail server, storage of a web page in the course
of transmission to a particular user, and other transient copies that occur en route.
88. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a).
89. See CASEY, supra note 44, at 107.
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must have been placed online by someone other than the ISP and passively
transmitted by the ISP to the subscriber at his or her request. 9° The ISP
must not modify the content of the material, 9' must comply with the
content provider's rules about "refreshing, reloading or other updating of
the material" ' and must not interfere with the technology that returns 'hit'
information to the content provider.93 In addition, the ISP must limit access
to the material in accordance with the content provider's conditions, such
as payment of a fee or provision of a password.' Finally, the ISP must
disable access to or take down infringing material only if it receives a
notice that states such material has been taken down or blocked at the
original source. 95 This requirement prevents situations in which taking
down the cached infringing material would be fruitless because the
material will simply be re-cached from the originating source. 9,
The third type of safe harbor activity is storing material for subscribers
97
on a system or network controlled or operated by the service provider.
Examples of such storage include providing server space for a user's web
site (web hosting) or for a chat room. 9 These ISPs do not qualify for the
"passive conduit" safe harbor, even if they also provide Internet access,
host content on their servers or control content on others'
since they
99
servers.
In order to qualify for this safe harbor, an ISP cannot have actual
knowledge of the infringing content or be aware of "facts and
circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent." 100 In
addition, the ISP cannot receive any direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity.' 0 ' Charging a flat fee for Internet access would not be
deemed a financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity. 10 2
This section also provides a 'notice and take down' procedure.'0 3 Upon

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

17 U.S.C.A.
17 U.S.C.A.
17 U.S.C.A.
17 U.S.C.A.
17 U.S.C.A.
17 U.S.C.A.

§ 512(b)(1)(A)-(B).
§ 512(b)(2)(A).
§ 512(b)(2)(B).
§ 512(b)(2)(C).
§ 512(b)(2)(D).
§ 512(b)(2)(E).

96. See CASEY, supra note 44, at 108.
97. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).

98. Since web hosting is the most common example of "storage at the direction of users," this
article will hereinafter refer to this liability limitation as the web hosting safe harbor.
99. For example, a web hosting agreement may require the ISP to upload content on a regular
basis from a third party's server to the Internet. On the other hand, sometimes content resides on
a third party's server located on the ISP's property, but the ISP does not have the contractual right
to access and control the content. See CASEY, supra note 44, at 158.
100. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(I)(A)(i)-(iii).
101. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B).
102. Id.
103. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(I)(C).
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being notified of alleged infringement, the ISP must expeditiously remove
or block access to the material. ° Finally, the ISP must designate an agent
to receive DMCA notices, file that person's contact information with the
Register of Copyrights, and publish its procedure for processing DMCA
notices on its web site. 05
Providing information location tools is the fourth type of activity which
qualifies for the limitation of liability. 106 An information location tool is
equivalent to a search engine or hypertext link. 07 The conditions for
qualifying for this safe harbor are identical to those that apply to web
hosting providers except for the notice and take down procedure. In order
for the ISPs compliance to be mandatory, the copyright owner must
provide the ISP with a DMCA notice that identifies the hyperlink or search
engine linking to the infringing material.'08 Although this safe harbor does
not specify that an agent must be designated for receipt of DMCA notices,
as is specified for the web hosting safe harbor, it is a wise idea for ISPs to
do so anyway.
D. Congress' Attempt to Balance the Interests of Copyright
Holders and ISPs
Title II was enacted to preserve strong incentives for both service
providers and copyright owners to cooperate in detecting and dealing with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked
environment. 1°9 Title IIs safe harbors are intended to provide greater
certainty to ISPs concerning their legal exposure for infringements that
may occur on their systems. The House Conference Report accompanying
H.R. 2281 notes that Title I[ "offers the advantage of incorporating and
building on those judicial applications of existing copyright law to the
digital environment that have been widely accepted as fair and
reasonable."'"10 At the same time, Congress did not intend to determine
whether or not an ISP would be liable for conduct that fails to qualify for

104. In order to be effective, anotification must be in writing, be given to the ISP's designated
agent, and must include the following information: 1) physical or electronic signature of copyright
owner or her authorized agent, 2) identification of the copyrighted work(s) claimed to have been
infringed, 3) identification of the allegedly infringing material, 4) contact information for the
complaining party, 5) a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that such use
of the material has not been authorized by the copyright owner and 6) a statement under penalty

of perjury that the notification is accurate. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3).
105. 17 U.S.C.A. §512(c)(2).
106. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d).
107. Congress purposefully used a term that would broadly cover a range of future
technological methods of locating material. See CASEY, supranote 44, at 160.

108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(d)(3).
109. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 105-796, at 73 (1998).
110. Id.
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one of the safe harbors. In those situations, the doctrines of existing law
would apply, and liability would attach to the extent that a court finds that:
1) the requirements of direct infringement, contributory infringement or
vicarious liability have been met, 2) the conduct is not excused by any
other exception or limitation and 3) monetary remedies are appropriate."'
Finally, although Title H does not mandate monitoring, it is not intended
to discourage an ISP from monitoring its service for infringing material.' 2
An ISP does not lose eligibility for the liability limitations simply because
it engaged in a monitoring program before being notified of a potential
infringement." 3
The "passive conduit" safe harbor, Section 512(a)," 4 codifies the
Netcom decision. 1 5 This section overrules the suggestion in the Playboy
case that passive, automatic acts of ISPs could constitute direct
infringement, and instead provides certainty that Netcom and its progeny
will be the law. Thus, Congress intended to preserve immunity for ISPs
that do nothing more than automatically transmit messages between users
and move packets of information to and from the Internet, regardless of
whether these ISPs are aware of infringing activity." 6
Congress intended to subject other (non-passive) ISPs to a more
stringent knowledge standard. Congress contemplated that ISPs providing
web hosting, chat rooms or information location tools, such as hypertext
linking, would have to abide by a "red flag" test to qualify for limited
liability. Although generally these ISPs would not need to monitor their
service for infringing activity, if one of these ISPs became aware of a "red
flag" from which infringing activity is apparent, it would lose the liability
limitation if it took no action.
The "red flag" test has both a subjective and an objective element. It is
based on the ISPs subjective awareness of facts and circumstances
demonstrating infringement, as well as whether the infringement would
have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or
similar circumstances. Congress expected that once these ISPs became
aware of a "red flag," signaling apparent infringement, or actually knew
of infringing activity, they would have to act expeditiously to remove or
disable access to the infringing material. 1 7 Finally, Congress did not

111. Id
112. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(m).
113. Id.
114. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a).

115. Section 512(a) supports the Netcom court's determination that "[i]t would be especially
inappropriate to hold liable a service that acts more like a conduit, in other words, one that does not
itself keep an archive of files for more than a short duration." Netcom, supra note 8, at 1372.
116. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 19-20 (1998).
117. An ISP may learn of infringing activity on its own (through facts and circumstances
demonstrating infringement) or by receiving a notification from the copyright owner or its
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intend that actual knowledge or awareness of a "red flag" would be
imputed to any ISP based on information from the copyright owner that
does not substantially comply with the notification provisions of Section
512(c)(3)."s
Title II, as enacted, does not require web hosting ISPs to abide
unconditionally by the "red flag" test.n9 These ISPs avoid liability for
taking down infringing material only if they promptly notify the subscriber
and give the subscriber the opportunity to submit a counter-notification.
If the subscriber submits a.counter-notification, the ISP must replace the
removed material unless the copyright owner has filed a court action
against the alleged infringer for injunctive relief.'2°
V. WAS THE DMCA THE RIGHT SOLUTION?

A. Was Legislation Really Necessary?
Some commentators do not think legislation limiting the liability of
online service providers was necessary. Before the DMCA was enacted,
these commentators argued that such legislation would be a "solution in
search of a problem."' 2 For example, Michael Kirk, Executive Director of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, argued that it was
better to wait and see how the case law developed. During the House
hearings on the Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act, he testified:
"[ilt is difficult to identify jurisprudence which makes the issue
of online
'
liability a real problem as opposed to a perceived problem."'
Another commentator, Daniel Cahoy, suggested that there were "at
least two important reasons why legislation was not needed: 1) courts had
not yet interpreted copyright law in a manner which would have a chilling
effect on ISPs and 2) legislation constrains the courts at the very time they
need the most room to develop ISP liability doctrine."'
In his opinion,
courts, not legislatures, are more likely to analyze liability in a manner that

authorized agent in accordance with the notification procedures set forth in Section 512 (c)(3).
118. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Pr. 2, at 14 (1998). See also supra note 104 (describing the

elements of proper notification by the copyright owner or its authorized agent).
119. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2).
120. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2).
121. On-Line CopyrightLiability LimitationAct and WIPO CopyrightTreatiesImplementation
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2280 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Propertyof the House JudiciaryCommittee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Michael K. Kirk,
Executive Director, AIPLA).
122. Id.
123. Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service Provider
LiabilityforCopyrightInfringement: A Solution in Search ofa Problem?38 IDEA 335,354 (1998)
(quoting Kirk, supra note 121).
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is "fluid and responsive to changes in technology."'' 24 Further, he argued
that the then-pending legislation would have excessively limited ISP
liability.' 2 For example, in his view, Senate Bill 1146 would have
eliminated ISPs' incentive to curb infringement and would have tilted the
balance strongly in favor of ISPs. 26 Similarly, although both H.R. 2180
and H.R. 3209 allowed copyright owners to obtain injunctive relief, in his
opinion both bills gave little incentive to ISPs to "take any action to
prevent infringement" because they would
not be liable for any monetary
1 27
damages resulting from the infringement.
Others argue that the DMCA is flawed. One commentator suggests that
"Congress' decision to leave the underlying law of OSP [ISP] liability
unchanged creates a complicated scheme that goes too far in encouraging
ISPs to advance the' interests of content providers by removing alleged
copyright infringements from the Internet." 128 In addition, he argues that
the DMCA fails to clarify the underlying law, leaving open the possibility
that courts will impose broad ISP liability. 29
This is not the prevailing view, however. Most commentators agree that
legislation was necessary and the DMCA, albeit imperfect, was a feasible
solution. 30 As pointed out by one commentator, "just because a small
handful of district court judges had held unknowing [ISPs] not liable does
not mean that the trend would have continued."' 3' Absent the DMCA, not
all courts may have been willing to follow Netcom. Other courts may have
adopted the Playboy rationale, holding ISPs liable even when they are
unaware of infringing activity by their subscribers. This would have meant
124. Id. at 360.
125. "It is extremely difficult to craft measures which do not upset the delicate balance which
has arisen both spontaneously and through the thoughtful jurisprudence of the courts. The current
system limits the liability of [ISPs] to a level where they can operate efficiently and profitably
while maintaining the incentive to curb truly egregious infringement." Id.
126. Id. at 356.
127. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
128. Yen, supra note 30, at 1838.
129. Id. See also Jo Dale Carothers, Protection of Intellectual Property on the World Wide
Web: Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Sufficient? 41 ARIZ. L REV. 937, 960 (1999)
("although the benefits of the Web may far outweigh the short term concerns, it is not at all clear
that the DMCA is sufficient to encourage creators to make their works available on the Web. At
the very least, it is clear that the DMCA does not address many important issues that face Web
users as the new millennium approaches.")
130. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING - WI.MER,
CUTLER & PICKERING, Nov. 23, 1999; Jennifer Kostyu, Comment: Copyright Infringement on the
Internet: Determiningthe Liability of InternetService Providers,48 CATH. U.L REV. 1237 (1999);
Bruce A. Lehman, The DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct of 1998:An Idea Whose Time HasCome,
International Intellectual Property Institute, <http://www.iipi.orglemg/viewpts/DMCA.htm> (last
visited Dec. 2, 2000).
131. Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers:
Problem Solved...For Now, 51 FED. COMM. LJ. 823, 831 (1999).
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that some ISPs would have had to police their networks for infringing
activity, while others operating in different jurisdictions would have been
exempt from strict liability. In addition, allowing courts to develop a
piecemeal case-by-case approach would have left ISPs uncertain as to
which precautionary measures to adopt to prevent infringement.
Some may argue that ISPs could have achieved certainty through
contract law. 132 For example, Internet Service Agreements can (and most
probably do) require subscribers to indemnify the ISP if the ISP is found
directly, contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringement.
This was not an ideal solution, however, because many subscribers would
not have the ability to pay large damage awards. Thus, some other solution
was necessary.
B. The FirstCases ConsideringDMCA Defenses to ISP Liability
To date, only a few courts have considered a DMCA safe harbor
defense to copyright infringement.
1. The Napster Litigation
In the first of a series of cases involving the now infamous Napster
service, Napster moved for partial summary judgment as to the
applicability of the Section 512(a) "passive conduit" safe harbor. 133
Napster argued that the entire Napster system falls within that safe harbor
and hence the plaintiffs were not entitled to monetary damages or
injunctive relief except as narrowly specified by Title 11.134 U.S. District
Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel denied the motion. In order to understand
why, it is necessary to briefly explain how the Napster service works.
Napster owns proprietary "MusicShare" software, which it makes
freely available for Internet users to download. Users who obtain Napster' s
software can then share MP3 music files 135 with others logged onto the
Napster system. Napster allows users to locate and directly exchange MP3
files stored on others' hard drives without paying a fee. 36 Napster
provides a directory and index of MP3 files that users who are logged on

132. See, e.g., Jo Dale Carothers, supra note 129 (citing Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking
Barriers:The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual PropertyLaw, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ.
827, 829 (1998) and Julie E. Cohen, Copyrightand the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L. 1089, 1141 (1998)).
133. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
134. Id. at *9-12. Subsection 512 limits the types of injunctive relief which may be issued
against "passive conduit" ISPs. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512()(1)(B).
135. MP3 technology allows for the fast and efficient conversion of compact disc recordings
into computer files that may be downloaded over the Internet. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243 at *2, n. 1.
136. Id. at *3.
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1 37
wish to share, but does not store any of the MP3 files on its servers.
When the requesting user clicks on the name of an MP3 file listed in
Napster's directory, the Napster server routes the request to the "host"
user's 3 browser. The host user's browser responds that it either can or
cannot supply the file. If the host user can supply the file, the Napster
server communicates the host's Internet Protocol (IP) address and routing
information to the requesting user's browser.' 39 The MP3 file is actually
transmitted over the Internet directly between requesting and host users,
but the connection could not take place without the Napster server.'4"
In response to Napster's argument that it is entitled to Section 512(a)
protection, plaintiffs argued that Napster is not a passive conduit but rather
provides information location tools covered by the more stringent
eligibility requirements of Section 512(d).' 41 Judge Patel did not rule upon
plaintiffs' Section 512(d) argument, 142 and analyzed the 512(a) argument
as follows. 43 She assumed that Napster is a "service provider" under the
broader definition of subsection 512(k)(1)(A); that is, the court assumed
Napster transmits information without modifying the content.'"
Nevertheless, she held, with what the author believes to be persuasive
reasoning, that Napster's role in the transmissionof MP3 files was not
entitled to Section 512(a) protection because such transmission does not
occur through Napster's system.145
With regard to whether Napster provides connections for material
through its system (and thus may be entitled to Section 512(a) protection),
Judge Patel's reasoning is more troublesome."4 The plaintiffs conceded
that Napster's servers, and the MusicShare browsers on its users'
computers, are all part of Napster's system. 47 However, it is not clear that
Congress intended to exclude this type of activity from liability protection,
especially because it used the terms "providing connections" and
"transmitting" disjunctively.'" Although Napster does not transmit
material, if one assumes that its servers and its users' browsers are all part

137. Id. at *4.
138. "Host" user refers to the user who makes the requested MP3 file available for
downloading. Id.
139. Id. at *5.
140. Id. at *6.
141. Id at *12.
142. Id. at*19, n. 6.
143. See id. at *19.
144. Id. at *21-22.
145. Recall that Section 512(a) is applicable only to service providers "transmitting, routing
or providing connections for, material throughasystem ornetwork controlled or operated by or for
the service provider." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (emphasis added).
146. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 at *23.
147. Id. at *21.
148. Id. at *24.
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of the same system, Napster does appear to be "providing connections"
through its system by conveying address information between requesting
users and host users. Nevertheless, Judge Patel
found that Napster does not
49
provide connections through its system.
In addition, Judge Patel ruled Napster was not entitled to the DMCA's
safe harbor protections for another reason.'50 Plaintiffs had raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Napster complied with Section
512's general eligibility requirements.' Judge Patel found that Napster
did not demonstrate that it had reasonably implemented a policy of
terminating repeat52infringers, as required by Section 512(i)(1)(A), before
the suit was filed.1
Subsequently, in July 2000, Judge Patel granted the RIAA's request for
a preliminary injunction and ordered Napster to shut down. Two days
later, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth
Circuit") temporarily stayed Judge Patel's injunction pending a hearing on
the merits.153
In February 2001, the Ninth Circuit released its long-awaited
decision.1 4 The court held that Napster must prevent users from gaining
access to copyrighted content through the lists of songs archived by its
users.15 5 As to the DMCA "safe harbor" defense, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with Judge Patel's finding that Section 512(d) cannot shield
contributory infringers from liability. 5 6 Instead, the court left open the
possibility that Section 512 may protect Napster at trial. 57 Nevertheless,
the court expressed reservations as to whether: 1) Napster is a "service
provider" as defined in Section 512(d); 2) copyright owners must give a
service provider "official" notice of infringing activity in order for it to
have the requisite knowledge of infringement; and 3) Napster complies
with the DMCA's requirement that a service provider must establish a
58
detailed copyright compliance policy.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a more
narrowly crafted injunction. 15 According to the court, an injunction

149. Id.
150. Id. at *27-30. At a later stage of the proceeding, the court reiterated that Napster cannot
invoke the protection of the DMCA. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.2d 896,919,
n. 24.
151. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *26; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §512(i)(a).
152. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist.6243, at *28.
153. A &MRecordsv. Napster,Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18688 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000).
154. A & M Records v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2000).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1025.
157. Id.
158. lId
159. Id. at 1029. On March 5, 2001, Judge Patel issued a revised preliminary injunction
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against the song-swapping service was "not only warranted but
required. ' ' 1"
2. ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities
In February 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
("Fourth Circuit") decided its first case interpreting Title 11.161 The case
presented an issue of first impression for the court- - whether an ISP
enjoys a safe harbor from copyright infringement liability when it receives
an "imperfect" notice of infringement activity on its system.162
ALS Scan owns copyrights for "adult" photographs displayed on the
163
Internet to paying subscribers and sold on CD ROMs and videotapes.
RemarQ Communities ("RemarQ") is an ISP that provides access to over
30,000 newsgroups which cover thousands of subjects.t 4 Two of
RemarQ's newsgroups included ALS Scan's name in the titles. These
newsgroups contained hundreds of postings that infringe ALS Scan's
copyrights. The postings were placed in these newsgroups by RemarQ's
subscribers. '65 Upon discovering that RemarQ databases contained
material that infringed ALS Scan's copyrights, ALS Scan sent a letter to
RemarQ identifying the newsgroups but failing to identify the particular
images protected by ALS' copyrights.'6 RemarQ responded by refusing
to comply with ALS Scan's demand, but advising ALS Scan that RemarQ
would eliminate individual infringing
images if ALS Scan identified them
"with sufficient specificity."167
ALS sued RemarQ for direct and contributory copyright infringement.
Recognizing that Title II codifies the seminal Netcom decision, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that RemarQ could not be held
liable for direct copyright infringement merely because it provided access
to a newsgroup containing infringing material.168
The Fourth Circuit also considered RemarQ's DMCA "safe harbor"
defense. 69 RemarQ argued it qualifies for the liability limitation set forth
in Section 512(c) (the "web hosting" safe harbor). 7 0° As to the
pending final judgment. A &M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal.
March 5, 2001).
160. Napsier,239 F.3d at 1027.
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ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (2001).
Id. at 620.
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Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621.
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Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
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"knowledge" requirement in that section, the Fourth Circuit found that
RemarQ did have actua knowledge of the infringing material even before
being contacted by ALS Scan. 17 1 In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that
ALS Scan had substantially complied with the "notice" requirement. 72
Although Title II requires a copyright owner to give the ISP a detailed
notice of infringement, the copyright holder must only provide information
that is "reasonably sufficient" to permit the service provider to locate the
allegedly infringing material. The court correctly noted that the DMCA
requires only "substantial" compliance with Section 512(c)'s notice
requirements.173 Since ALS Scan's letter referred RemarQ to two web
addresses where RemarQ could find pictures of ALS Scan's models and
obtain ALS Scan's copyright information, and virtually all photographs on
the web sites identified in the letter were infringing, the letter
"substantially complied" with the DMCA.174 Thus, RemarQ was not
entitled to a safe harbor defense.'75
3. Other Cases Interpreting Title II
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,176 defendants were
distributing, via the Internet, a software utility called DeCSS which
enables users to break an encryption-based access control and copy
prevention system for movies in DVD format. One defendant sought
protection under Section 512(c). However, the court held that defendant
could not invoke that safe harbor because plaintiffs claimed violations of
Section 1201(a), which applies to anti-circumvention products and
technologies, not copyright infringement"
Finally, in Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,'78 the court noted in
passing that the defendant, an Internet-based commercial real estate listing
service, might be entitled to DMCA liability protection. 79 The plaintiff
alleged that LoopNet posted on its web site several photographs from the
plaintiffs databases, thereby infringing plaintiffs copyright in the
photographs and was therefore liable for direct and contributory copyright
infringement. The court did not reach the issue of whether the defendant

171. Id at 623-24. Each newsgroup had "als" as part of its title, and each photograph
belonging to ALS Scan hadALS Scan's name and/orthe copyright symbol next to it.
172. Id at 625.
173. Id
174. Id
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 626.
82 F. Supp.2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 217, n.17.
106 F. Supp.2d 780 (2001).
Id at 782, n.1.
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was entitled to a DMCA safe harbor, because the case was dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction."'
VI. CONCLUSION

Title II attempts to strike a balance between copyright holders' interests
and ISPs' interests by protecting ISPs from monetary liability while
allowing copyright holders to obtain injunctive relief.'81 As explained
above, copyright holders can stop infringing activity if they properly notify
the infringer's ISP.'82 Non-passive ISPs cannot ignore a DMCA-compliant
notice of claimed infringement, or facts and circumstances that indicate
potential infringement, or actual knowledge of infringement. 83 Although
"passive conduit" ISPs do not have the ability to take down infringing
material because it does not reside on their networks, they are subject to
a court order obtained by the copyright holder requiring them to terminate
the infringer's account1 8 ' And, since the DMCA provides a good faith
defense for taking down or disabling access to infringing material,

85

it

encourages even "passive conduit" ISPs to do so.
Bob Goodlatte, the Congressman who led the pre-DMCA negotiations,
feels that Title II is working just as Congress intended. Speaking at a
congressional forum after the Ninth Circuit's February Napster ruling,
Representative Goodlatte said the decision affirms the strong protections
afforded to artists and record labels under the DMCA. "The court should
be praised for allowing the DMCA to do its work. This was a carefully
written law that was faced with the amazingly difficult task of adjusting
to changes in technology."'' 8 6 But some critics of the
DMCA argue that it gives copyright holders an unfair advantage
because it is too expensive and time-consuming for ISPs to challenge or
appeal copyright holders' requests to take down allegedly infringing
material. 18,

180. Id. at 787.
181. 17 U.S.C.A. §5120).
182. 17 U.S.C.A. §512(c)(3).
183. 17 U.S.C.A. §512(d).
184. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j)(1)(B).
185. "a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service
provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be
infringing or based on facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardlessof whether the material is ultimately determined to be infringing." 17 U.S.C.A. §
512(g)(1) (emphasis added).
186. Brian Krebs, Steven Bonisteel and Robert Macmillan, Music Industry Execs Cheer
Napster Ruling, POST-NEWSWEEK BuSINESS INFORMATION, Feb. 12, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Library, News Group File, Most Recent 90 Days.
187. See Lisa M. Bowman, Web War Rages Over DVD-Cracking Site, ZDNET NEWS, January
24,2001, at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/storiestnews/0,4586,2678087,00.html (last visited March
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The battle is not over yet. Copyright owners are expected to lobby
Congress to pass legislation requiring ISPs to pay for the unauthorized use
of copyrighted material on Web sites they host, even if they have no prior
knowledge that the content violated a copyright."s If the DMA is
amended, ISPs, already struggling financially, could be liable for millions
of dollars in royalties or will have to spend time and money closely
monitoring every Web site they host.' s9
In the author's opinion, Title I should not be amended until the case
law is further developed. To date, only two federal appellate courts have
analyzed safe harbor protection under Title H. When Representative
Coble introduced the legislation that ultimately resulted in Title H, his
goals were to exempt conduct where ISP liability does not seem
appropriate because of a low level of participation, control and knowledge,
while ensuring that ISPs have adequate incentives to assist copyright
owners in preventing infringement. He and other members of Congress
clearly intended to advance a policy of encouraging ISPs to provide
service to many individuals without having to police the massive amounts
of data which would consequently travel over their systems.190 It is simply
to early to tell whether these goals have been achieved.

31,2001); see also Brad King, ISPs Face Down DMCA, WMREDNEWS.COM, December 23,2000, at
http://www.wirednews.comlnewsltechnology/O, 1282,40816,00.html (last visited April 2, 2001).
188. See Paul Prince, Rough Water -- Service ProvidersHope a New Congress Will Throw
Them a Lifeline, TELE.COM, Feb. 5, 2001, availableat LEXIS, News Library, News Group File,
Most Recent 90 Days.
189. Id.
190. Statement of Rep. Coble, supra note 64.

